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James Boyd White

The editors of Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, and its contrib
utors too, deserve congratulations for its ten years of most successful life.
& a small contribution to this moment of celebration I should like to
suggest a particular line of thought about what the reading of literature
helps us to see about law.
It is common today, in the academic world at least, to talk as though
"law" were simply the set of policy choices made by courts, legislatures, or
other legal actors that are expressed in legal rules. From this point of view
the key question becomes whether these choices are good or bad. This is
the premise, for example, of most work in Law and Economics.
While no one would deny the importance of the policy choices made
by courts and legislatures, there is an important sense in which such
choices are not distinctively legal. Anyone can contribute to the conver
sation about them, from nearly any point of view, including those of a
great many academic disciplines. If you think about law not so much as
the set of choices made by those who manage our institutions, but as our
distinctive activities of mind and imagination - as what lawyers and
judges actually do with language and each other, as what we teach our stu
dents to do - the situation changes. For the lawyer's question is never the
simple or abstract one, which rule or choice would be best, but always
instead, what choice should be made by this court (or legislature or
agency or lawyer) given the existence of a set of authoritative choices
made by others, at other times and places, as these are reflected in the
body of texts that make up the law - legislation, constitutional provi
sions, regulations, opinions, even contracts. The essence of law is the sep
aration of powers; it is thus a constant question for the lawyer what
authority should be granted the purported exercise of power by another
agency, as well as what it means. In a real case one can normally expect
vigorous argument on both kinds of questions. These are matters as to
which the policy-maker as such has nothing to say; they require particu
larized judgments of a unique kind; and they are at the heart of law.
In the other direction, the lawyer must face the reality of her client's
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experience, and the fact that it can never adequately be cast into the language the lawyer is given to speak: the suffering, the uncertainty, the frustration, the sense of the story from the client's point of view, can never be
adequately represented in language, without loss or distortion.
Nonetheless, the lawyer's job is to find a way to talk about this experience
in the language of the law; this means that she is always thinking about
that language itself, what it can do, what it can be made to do, and what
its limits are. In this connection the central questions the lawyer asks herself are: "What can we say? What will they say in response? How can we
respond to them?" All this is a call to invention, to reimagining the
world, not to the routine application of rules or principles. Again, to this
dimension of legal life the policy maker has nothing to say.
The lawyer thus thinks constantly not only about the merits of the
substantive question before him, but about how he thinks, how he
expresses himself. And once he begins to put his own intellectual and
expressive activities into question in this way, a thousand issues arise:
How should he talk about the courts and legislatures and other public
actors in his world, and how should he read their utterances? How should
he talk about his client, the party on the other side, the victim if there is
one, or about the public? Can he find a way to talk about his client's life
that does justice to her experience? Can he find a way to talk about the
work of the court that does justice to it, and at the same time supports his
client's case? Can he find ways to tell the stories of the facts underlying
the case, of the development of law, of the passage of this legislation, of
the decision made by the court below, that will be coherent and lead to a
result he can define as legal and fair? The whole way he imagines the
world is put into question, and in highly particular ways.
This is the point at which reading of what we call "literature" has its
greatest resonance for the lawyer, for literature at its best is always about
the language in which it is written, its ways of imagining the experience
of others, its response to the conventions of authority with which it
works, and so on. Exactly how the education offered by literature can
work for the lawyer is the topic not for a sentence or paragraph, but for a
lifetime, and of course there will be disagreements, some fruitful, some
less so. But it is worth making here the simple point that the experience
of working with literary texts is especially helpful to us as lawyers, for it
trains us to focus on the meaning of what is said by particular speakers in

particular contexts; on the way a language, or set of generic conventions
(like those of a novel), commit us to one way of imagining the world or
another, making certain claims of significance possible, others impossible;
and on the way in which the use of language is an inherently ethical and
political activity, as we define ourselves and those we speak about in what
we say. All of this teaches us that the distinctive life of the law is a life of
the mind and imagination.

